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the Limitation Act's broader scope includes damages to park system resources, the Court held 
that the specific tailoring of the PSRP A compels the Court to apply the more specific statute. 
In short, the Court of Appeals determined that Tug Allie-B's liability could not be limited 
under the act because the PSRPA's unlimited damage provisions irreconcilably conflicted with 
the Limitation Act and the PSRP A was the more recent and more specific statute. 
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HANDLING OF ASBESTOS CLAIMS UNDER THE JONES ACT, 
UNSEAWORTHINESS AND MAINTENANCE AND CURE 
A complaint under the Jones Act which claims an asbestos related medical condition 
requires a single baseline examination where none of the plaintiffs had been so diagnosed or 
significantly exposed was dismissed because plaintiffs were neither sick nor injured and had 
not as yet developed symptoms of disease. Nor were causes of action for unseaworthiness, 
maintenance and cure assault and battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress 
viable. 
Marine Asbestos Cases v. American Hawaiian Cruises, Inc., 
265 F.3d 861 (91h Cir. 2001) 
(Filed September 10, 2001) 
Plaintiffs, 174 seamen who had worked aboard the S.S. Independence and/or the S.S. 
Constitution, appeal the dismissal of their claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 688 
(2000), based on theories of unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, assault, battery, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs claim to have been exposed to asbestos in 
the course of employment on board the vessels. However, at the time of litigation, none of these 
plaintiffs has been diagnosed with any asbestos-related medical condition, but have sought 
recovery in the form a court-supervised medical monitoring program that would provide each 
plaintiff with a single baseline medical examination. Plaintiff also sought punitive damages as 
well as damages and costs for defendants' continuing failure to provide relief. The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal because plaintiffs failed to show how they would benefit from a single 
baseline examination where no abnormalities are apparent. 
The principal question the Ninth Circuit addressed on appeal was whether, as a matter of 
law, a seaman could recover a single baseline examination under: the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, 
and maintenance and cure. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court and the magistrate 
judge's conclusion that the Jones Act itself does not permit recovery for medical monitoring for 
plaintiffs who have not yet developed symptoms of disease. However the court found the act 
itself affords common law principles great weight when interpreting its scope. See Consolidated 
Rail v. Gottshall, 512 US 532, 544, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 29 L. Ed. 2d 427. Citing Abuan v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1993) the Ninth Circuit reiterated that monitoring damages to 
plaintiffs who have not yet developed symptoms of disease are available. However, plaintiffs 
must show that they are within four elements established by the Third Circuit, In re Paoli R.R. 
Yard PCB Litigation, 915 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990). The four Paoli elements are: 
1. Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance through the 
negligent actions of the defendant. 
2. As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly increased risk of 
contracting a serious latent disease. 
3. That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably 
necessary. 
4. Monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early detection and 
treatment of the disease possible and beneficial. 
The Ninth Circuit stated that even if medical monitoring were available under the Jones 
Act to a seaman who satisfied the Paoli factors, the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. Because 
plaintiffs failed to establish the third factor which requires sufficient evidence to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the reasonableness and necessity of the type of medical monitoring that 
they seek. The Ninth Circuit was willing to assume first Paoli factor meaning the plaintiffs raised 
a genuine issue of material fact as to their exposure to asbestos and the second Paoli factor, which 
requires the plaintiffs' to quantify their increased risk of disease. However, the Ninth Circuit was 
not willing to assume the third and fourth Paoli factors which require plaintiffs to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact of an increased risk of disease which would make medical monitoring 
reasonably necessary, and that early detection would provide any clinical benefit. Because the 
plaintiffs could not show that there is clinical value to administering any such treatment before 
the onset of symptoms of these diseases the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ,grant of 
summary judgment for defendants on the Jones Act claim. 
Plaintiffs also brought a claim under unseaworthiness, which arises from a breach by the 
shipowner of the absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel; that is, a vessel that is reasonably fit 
for its intended use. In order to recover for an injury caused by an unseaworthy condition, a 
seaman must establish that: (1) the seaman's work was in the ship's service and that the warranty 
of seaworthiness therefore applies; (2) the seaman was injured by a piece of equipment not 
reasonably fit for its intended use; and (3) the piece of equipment was part of the ship's 
equipment or an appurtenant appliance. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary 
judgement for defendant on the unseaworthiness claim, which imposes liability without fault 
because it would be anomalous to award the medical monitoring remedy on a lesser showing of 
injury. The court then dismissed plaintiffs' claim under the doctrine of cure, which provides that 
the vessel and her owners must provide medical care for a seaman who becomes sick or is 
wounded in the service of the ship. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim under the 
doctrine of cure because plaintiffs were not sick nor could they show that they had suffered from 
an InJUry. The Ninth Circuit also found the assault, battery, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress were properly dismissed because such relief is available to a seaman against 
his employer for personal injury are limited to maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, and the 
Jones Act. 
Cristina L. Fernandez 
Class of 2003 
